Abstract: We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payo s depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty a ecting the aggregator and we obtain existence results for the stochastic resulting game. Some examples are illustrated. The talk relies on [1,2].
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